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- NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
- being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
- The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
- prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
- See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
-
- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
-
- Syllabus
-
- NEGONSOTT v. SAMUELS, WARDEN, et al.
- certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
- the tenth circuit
- No. 91-5397. Argued January 11, 1993-Decided February 24, 1993
-
- Petitioner Negonsott, a member of the Kickapoo Tribe and a resident of
- the Kickapoo reservation in Kansas, was convicted by a County
- District Court jury of aggravated battery for shooting another Indian
- on the reservation. The court set aside the conviction on the ground
- that the Federal Government had exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute
- Negonsott for the shooting under the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18
- U. S. C. 1153, which encompasses 13 enumerated felonies
- committed by ``[a]ny Indian against . . . the person or property of
- another Indian or other person . . . within the Indian country.''
- However, the State Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, holding
- that the Kansas Act, 18 U. S. C. 3243, conferred on Kansas
- jurisdiction to prosecute all crimes committed by or against Indians
- on Indian reservations in the State. Subsequently, the Federal
- District Court dismissed Negonsott's petition for a writ of habeas
- corpus, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
- Held: The Kansas Act explicitly confers jurisdiction on Kansas over all
- offenses involving Indians on Indian reservations. Congress has
- plenary authority to alter the otherwise exclusive nature of federal
- jurisdiction under 1153. Standing alone, the Kansas Act's first
- sentence-which confers jurisdiction on Kansas over ``offenses
- committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations . . . to the
- same extent as its courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed
- elsewhere within the State in accordance with the laws of the
- State''-is an unambiguous grant of jurisdiction over both major and
- minor offenses. And the most logical meaning of the Act's second
- sentence-which provides that nothing in the Act shall ``deprive''
- federal courts of their ``jurisdiction over offenses defined by the laws
- of the United States''-is that federal courts shall retain their
- jurisdiction to try all offenses subject to federal jurisdiction, while
- Kansas courts shall have jurisdiction to try persons for the same
- conduct when it violates state law. This is the only reading of the
- Kansas Act that gives effect to every clause and word of the statute,
- and it is supported by the Act's legislative history. In contrast, if this
- Court were to accept Negonsott's argument that the second sentence
- renders federal jurisdiction exclusive whenever the underlying
- conduct is punishable under federal law, Kansas would be left with
- jurisdiction over only those minor offenses committed by one Indian
- against the person or property of another, a result that can hardly be
- reconciled with the first sentence's unqualified grant of jurisdiction.
- There is no need to resort to the canon of statutory construction that
- ambiguities should be resolved in favor of Indians, since the Kansas
- Act quite unambiguously confers jurisdiction on the State. Pp. 2-12.
- 933 F. 2d 818, affirmed.
- Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
- Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined,
- and in all but Part II-B of which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined.
-